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IN THE SUPREME COUR7 OF THE STATE OF UTAH

BIG BuTTE RANCH, INC. ,
Appellant,
vs.

CASE NO. 14630

MARJORIE R. HOLM, CARL
WILLIAM HOLM and ESTHER
B. HOLM, His Wife,
Respondents.

RESPONDENTS' BRIEF

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an action wherein the Appellant brought suit against
the Respondents to enforce a provision in a Uniform Real Estate Contract, which provision was found by the District Court of the Third
Judicial District, Salt Lake County, State of Utah, to have been
terminated and of no force and effect whatsoever.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The District Court found that the Termination Agreement entered into between the parties was ambiguous and allowed oral testimony to explain the same; and thereafter found that the Appellant
was estopped to now attempt to enforce the Uniform Real Estate Contract that was the subject of the Termination Agreement.
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondents submit that this Court should affirm tf:t: decisi';
of the District Court.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The Appellant and CARL O.N. HOLM, MARJORIE HOLM, CARL W. HOLY.
and ESTHER B. HOLM, entered into a Uniform Real Estate

Co~tract

on or

about the 1st day of April, 1969, for the purchase of a farm ir. IJaho
(R. 5-12) of which CARL O.N. HOLM, who died prior to the commencement
of this action, was the principal purchaser.

CARL W. HOLM, sc ,1

c~

CARL O.N. HOLM, and his wife, ESTHER HOLM, the only Respondents who
lived on and worked the farm, remained on the farm for approximately
three years when the Respondents then defaulted under the terms of
the Uniform Real Estate Contract.

On August 28, 1972, the Respond-

ents and Appellant entered into a Termination Agreement (R. 34-37)
of the Uniform Real Estate Contract.
The Termination Agreement was drafted by Ronald
who is the attorney and an officer for the Appellant.
was explained by Ronald

c.

c.

Barker,

The document

Barker, who represented to the Respond-

ents that all obligations under the Uniform Real Estate Contract endec
upon the execution of the Termination Agreement.

(See Point II for

testimony.)
The Respondents were led to believe that any and all obligations which they had to supply beef, lamb, potatoes, honey and
wheat to the Appellant, and which under Paragraphs 25 and 26 of the
Uniform Real Estate Contract was purported to survive any termination or default of the subject Uniform Real Estate Contract, terminated upon the execution of the Termination AgreeMent.

The
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Respondents were brought to this position because of the wording in
the Termination Agreement and the representations made to the Respondents by Ronald C. Barker and the president of the Appellant corporation, Harold K. Beecher.

(See Point II for testimony.)

It would appear that all the Appellant and its attorney had
to do in preparing the Termination Agreement in order to preserve
the payment of beef, lamb, potatoes, honey and wheat was to specifically and clearly state in the Agreement that beef, lamb, potatoes,
honey and wheat should still be supplied.

During the discussions

that were held at Mr. Beecher's office on August 28, 1972, between
the Respondents and Ronald C. Barker and Harold K. Beecher, on the
Termination Agreement, the obligation to furnish beef, lamb, potatoes, honey and wheat was not raised nor did any of the parties recall the subject matter being discussed.

(T. 63.)

The discussion

between the parties was that all obligations under the Uniform Real
Estate Contract ended upon execution of the Termination Agreement,
not that anything survived the Termination Agreement.

It should be

noted that once the Respondents had left the farm that the Respondents were without means to furnish the beef, lamb, pot.atoes, honey
and wheat to the Appellant, for that produce came from the farm
operations, and the Appellant knew this when the Termination Agreement was executed.
Prior to the Termination Agreement being executed, the Appellant requested CARL W. HOLM and ESTHER HOLM, his wife, to remain
upon the land to tend and care for it until the Appellant could find
nother purchaser.

(T. 124.)

CARL W. HOLM and his wife, ESTHER HOLM,

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

agreed to remain in possession of and care for the subj t::c :_ property
and did so until the first part of January, 1973.
On the 30th day of April, 1975, the Appellant caused to be
served a Swnmons and Complaint, alleging that the Respondents had
not supplied the Appellant with the beef, lamb, potatoes, honey and
wheat which was the subject matter of Paragraph 25 of the Uniform
Real Estate Contract.

(R.

2-18.)

At no time prior to the commencement of this action and since
the Termination Agreement had been entered into between the parties
had the Appellant made any demand upon the Respondents for any beef,
lamb, potatoes, honey and wheat.

(T. 107.)

A period of almost three

years had elapsed since anything dealing with the obligations under
the Uniform Real Estate Contract was mentioned as surviving the
Termination Agreement.
The wording of the Termination Agreement is such that only
one conclusion could be reached, to-wit:

that all rights, duties,

liabilities and obligations of all the parties to the Uniform Real
Estate Contract were terminated upon the execution of the Termination Agreement.
The Trial Court held that the Termination Agreement was ambiguous and allowed oral testimony to be presented, after which the
Trial Court accepted the Respondents'

interpretation of the Termina·

tion Agreement that they believed they had no further obligation to
supply produce to the Appellant.

The Trial Court further held that

the actions of the parties from August 2 5, 19 7 2 up to the commencemer.:

-4Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization
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of this action lends credence to the interpretation of the Termination Agreement as given to it by the Respondents that they had no
further obligation to supply beef, lamb, potatoes, honey and wheat
to the Appellant.
The Trial Court further held that the Appellant had created
the ambiguous language in the Termination Agreement and thus, as
drafter of the Agreement it was to be construed against the Appellant, and that because of the Appellant's actions and silence for
almost three years on Respondents' alleged obligation to the Appellant, the Appellant was estopped from asserting a claim to the beef,
lamb, potatoes, honey and wheat.

(R. 62-64.)

POINT I

THE TERMINATION AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE PARTIES WAS AMBIGUOUS.
Upon reading the Termination Agreement entered into between
the parties on August 28, 1972 (T. 34-36), one can easily assume
that any obligation or liability owing between the respective parties has now terminated.

This is especially true when one reads

from Paragraph 3 the following wording:
"First party hereby releases second, third and
fourth parties from further liability or obligation
under the terms of said Uniform Real Estate Contract
The Respondents, upon reading the Termination Agreement and
from the representations made to them by Ron Barker, secretary and
attorney for the Appellant, believed that all obligations and liabilities, including the obligation to furnish beef, lamb, potatoes,
honey and wheat, which was part of the Uniform Real Estate Contract,
to the Appellant, had ended upon the making and siqning of the
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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Termination Agreement and it wasn't until almost three years later
that Appellant took a contrary position.
After reading the pleadings and the Termination Agreement the
court determined the Agreement to be ambiguous.

Where parties place

different meanings on a contract and there is evidence that the intent of the parties may be different or the contract on its face may
be seen as being ambiguous, giving use to different interpretations
by the parties, the Court may, upon either of the above, have the
contract declared as being ambiguous.

Petty v. Gindy Manufacturing

Corp, 17 U. 2d 32, 404 P. 2d 30 (1965); Union Pacific Railroad Company v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 17 U. 2d 255, 408 P. 2d 910 (1965);
Maw v. Noble, 10 U. 2d 440, 354 P. 2d 121 (1960); Wingets, Inc. v.
Bitters, 28 U. 2d 231, 500 P. 2d 1007 (1972); Continental Bank and
Trust Co. v. Bybee, 6

u.

2d 98, 306 P. 2d 773 (1957).

Each of the parties in this case had placed different interpretations on the meaning and intent of the Termination Agreement.
When this is coupled with the actions of the Appellant wherein the
Appellant represented to the Respondents that all obligations had
terminated and that the Appellant did not ask for any beef, lamb,
potatoes, honey and wheat for almost three years after the Termination Agreement, it is easily seen that the Respondents were correct
in their belief that their obligations to the Appellant were forever terminated.
A Court in interpreting a contract will interpret it as sho~
by the acts of the parties themselves.

Zeese v. Siegel, 534 P.

2d 85 (1975); Hardinge Co., Inc. v. Eimco Corp. 1 U. 2d 320, 266 p,
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2d 494 (1954); Snow v. Utah Automobile Dealers, 112
2d 742 (1948).

u.

431, 188 P.

The acts of the parties in this matter were such as

to terminate all obligations upon the execution of the Termination
Agreement.
It was reasonable for the Respondents to believe that all
obligations terminated when the Agreement was signed.

The Termina-

tion Agreement specifically referred to the Uniform Real Estate Contract which contained the provision that the Respondents were to
supply the Appellant with beef, lamb, potatoes, honey and wheat.
As noted in Bullfrog Marina, Inc. v. Lentz, 28 U. 2d 261,
501 P. 2d 266 (1972), a case involving the leasehold interest in
houseboats, the general rule of law where there are two separate
agreements which relate to the same subject matter, is to read the
documents together.
. . the rule of law where two or more instruments
are executed by the same parties contemporaneously, or
at different times in the course of the same transaction,
and concern the same subject matter, they will be read
and construed together so far as determining the respective rights and interests of the parties, although they
do not in terms refer to each other."
(Cites omitted.)
P. 2d at 271.
Thus, from reading the Uniform Real Estate Contract and the
Termination Agreement together, the Respondents were justified in
their belief that all obligations contained within the Uniform
Real Estate Contract ended upon execution of the Termination Agreement.

The Termination Agreement stated that the Respondents were

relieved from further liability or obligation under the terms of
the

Unifo~m

Real Estate Contract.

The Uniform Real Estate Contract

contained the requirement for beef, lamb, potatoes, honey and wheat
Which is the subject matter of this action.

Placing the documents
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together the Respondents thus interpreted their obligation to supply
beef, lamb, potatoes, honey and wheat to the Appellant as having
ceased, because all obligations under the Uniform Real Estate Contract were now terminated.

The Trial Court recognized thE: ambigui tJ

of the Termination Agreement and how a reasonable man unjE:r

th~

cir-

cumstances could believe that the obligation to furnish beef, lamb,
potatoes, honey and wheat had ceased.

Because of this, thE: Trial

Court ruled correctly in determining the Termination Agreel".ent to
be ambiguous.
Because the Agreement was ambiguous on its face the Trial
Court properly allowed parol evidence to determine the intE:nt and
meaning of the terms of the Agreement and what the parties had
meant when they signed the Agreement.
When a contract is ambiguous the Court may allow paro: evid.::•1ce to determine the intent of the parties and thus the con.;L:-.lction to be given to a contiact.

Zeese v. Siegel, supra; Continen-

tal Bank and Trust Co. v. Bybee, supra.
In this case, the Trial Court concluded that the parties had
meant to terminate all their liabilities and obligations owing to
one another and thus the obligation of the Respondents to supply
the Appellant with beef, lamb, potatoes, honey and wheat had ended.
The Termination Agreement had in fact terminated all obligations
arising under 'the Uniform Real Estate Contract.
POINT II
THE COURT PROPERLY APPLIED THE LAW OF UTAH IN CONSTRUING THE TERMINATION AGREEMENT AGAINST THE APPELLANT.
The Appellant not only drafted the document which was arnbiguou~
but the Appellant also attempted to mislead the Respondents.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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It is well sett~ed law that any ambiguity in a contract should
be construed against the party who prepared the contract, which in
this case was the Appellant.

Wingets Inc. v. Bitters, supra; Holley

v. Federal American Partners, et al., 29 U. 2d 212, 507 P. 2d 381
(1973); Maw v. Noble, supra; J. Seal v. Tayco, Inc., 16 u. 2d 323,
400 P. 2d 503 (1965).
Yet in this case the Appellant has not only prepared the contract and created the ambiguity, but also made representations to
Respondents, in their interpretation of the Termination Agreement,
to believe that all obligations, including the necessity to furnish
beef, lamb, potatoes, honey and wheat under the Uniform Real Estate
Contract had terminated.
The testimony of CARL W. HOLM at the trial was that he believed and was lead to believe that all

obli9~tions

~nder

the Uni-

foI""' Real Estate Contract ended upon the execution of the Terrninatior: Agreement and that no demand had ever been made from August

28, 1972 to the commencement of this lawsuit for the beef, lamb,
potatoes, honey and wheat.
"A

"Q

Well, what I am saying is the wording in this termination agreement led me to believe that there
would be no further obligation, produce or whatever,
because there would be no way to pay it with no farm
to do i t with.
It's the wording that led you to believe that; is
that correct?
(Tr. 99, L. 30; 100, L. 1-6.)

"A

Yes, uh-huh."

"Q

(By Mr. Barker)
Did you understand, after having
talked with your father or someone else some one
year before, that if you defaulted and if you lost
your rights to the ranch because of that default,
you would still owe the produce?

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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"A

Yes, depending on the circumstances of this thing.
I mean when you explained to us in the office of
Mr. Beecher that there would be no further obligation--"
(T. 101, L. 13-19.)

and
"BY MR. BEASLEY:
"Q

Mr. Holm, so I understand your testimony, it is your
testimony that from August 28 of 1972 until this lawsuit was commenced, no one made a demand on you for
the produce?

"A

Not until we got word of this summons, whatever you
call it."
(T. 104, L. 16-20.)

Rulon T. Jeffs, who was present at the meeting between the
parties, testified similarly to CARL W. HOLM in regards to the obligations between the parties terminating upon the execution of the
Termination Agreement.
"A

(Mr. Jeffs)
We discussed the terms of the agreement
and I asked if this resulted in absolving the Holms
of any further liability under the contract.

"Q

(Mr. Beasley) And was that question responded to?

"A

Yes, sir.

"Q

And by whom was the response made?

"A

Mr. Barker.

"Q

And what was his response?

"A

That it terminated the further liability of the Holms.

"Q

At the time of this meeting, do you recall any conversation with regard to produce?

"A

There was no discussion on the matter o[ p ... u.;.u.ct:."
(T. 110, L. 4-16.)

"Q

(Mr. Barker)
I am not asking about your understanding·
I am asking about whether or not you asked?

also:
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"A

Did I ask were they fully terminated from the agreement? Yes·."
(T. 116, L. 9-12.)

further:
"Q

(Mr. Barker)

And what was said about that, if anything?

"A

That it absolved from any liability under the contract.

"Q

Mr. Jeffs, who said that?

"A

I understood you said that."

(T. 118, L. 18-22.)

Then the testimony of ESTHER B. HOLM was taken which reinforced
the ':estimony of CARL W.

EOLM and Rulon T. Jeffs.

In discussing the

meeting at Mr. Beecher's office, ESTHER B. HOLM testified:
"Q

(Mr. Beasley)
Do you recall any of the specific things
that were discussed?

"A

Yes.
I remember Mr. Barker saying several times that
this would terminate us from any further obligation.
He felt that it was a fair agreement."
(T. 123, L.
28-30 and T. 124, L. 1-2.)

"Q

At any time during that meeting, do you recall anything
being said with regard to your continuing obligation
to supply Mr. Beecher with the produce that's set
forth in the contract?

"A

No, sir.

"Q

At any time since that meeting, prior to the commencement of this lawsuit, has anyone made a demand upon
you to supply that produce?

"A

No, sir, they did not."

also:

There was nothing said.

(T. 124, L. 19-27.)

further:

"Q

(Mr. Barker)
Was there any discussion about any parts
of it that you remember?

"A

Only that Mr. Jeffs asked you if this would terminate
us from all liabilities, and you said yes it would.

"Q

Do you have a specific recollection of that, or is
it a little hazy?
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"A

No.

It is not hazy.

I remer.iber it.

"Q

And how is it you remember that?

"A

I remember that you were -- you and he were there
talking. And you had already mentioned several times
the fairness of the agreement.
And he said, 'Does
this,' or words to that effect, 'does this terminate
all of their liabilities if they sign this, would it
terminate all the liabilities they had to Mr. Beecher?'
And you said yes it would."
(T. 127, L. 22-30 and T.
128, L. 1-5.)

In each instance the person testifying stated that the Appellant represented to the Respondents that the Termination Agreement
would end any further obligations or liabilities under the Uniform
Real Estate Contract.

The Appellant not only represented to the

Respondents that all obligations ended upon the signing of the Termination Agreement as to the produce, but represented to the Respond·
ents that everything in the way of liabilities and obligations undH
the Uniform Real Estate Contract had now ended.
In J. Seal v. Tayco, Inc., supra, a case involving the inter·
pretation of a contract for the delivery of brake shoes, the Court
stated at P. 2d 505:
" • • • it seems manifestly unfair to permit one
who formulates a contract to so fashion it as to
mislead the other party by setting forth a clearly
apparent promise or representation in order to
induce acceptance, and then designedly 'burying'
elsewhere in the document, in fine print, provisions which purport to limit or take away the
promise and/or preclude recovery for failure to
fulfill it. II
In the case before this Court the Appellant has attempted W
"bury" its intent in the ambiguity of the Termination Agreement a~
then represent to the Respondents that all obligations and liabilities had ended, including the obligation to supply beef, lamb,
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Machine-generated OCR,-12may contain errors.

potatoes, honey and wheat.

It can only be seen from such language

in the Agreement and the actions of the Appellant that the Appellant attempted to mislead the Respondents into believing that all
obligations had ceased under the Termination Agreement and that
the Respondents entered into the Termination Agreement believing that
all obligations were now terminated.

Such a belief was reasonable

under the circumstances and the Trial Court properly held for the
Respondents because of this.
It should also be noted that the actions of the Appellant
after the execution of the Termination Agreement were such as to
further lead the Respondents in their belief that all obligations
to the Appellant had ceased.
In the present case the actions of the Appellant were:
(1) making the Termination Agreement;

(2) representing to the Res-

pondents that all obligations in the Uniform Real Estate Contract
ended upon the execution of the termination; and (3) never making
demand, either written or oral, for the delivery of any beef, lamb,
potatoes, honey and wheat from August 28, 1972 {which was the date
of the execution of the Termination Agreement) until the commencernent of this lawsuit (T. 197, L. 12-18), which is a period of almost
three years.

From the actions of the Appellant the Respondents

believed their obligations to the Appellant had ended.

This Court

stated in Zeese v. Estate of Max Siegel, supra, at P. 2d 90:
"Under the doctrine of practical construction, when a
contract is ambiguous and the parties place their own construction on their agreement and so perform, the court may
consider this as persuasive evidence of what their true
intention was."
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In this case, the Appellant stated its intention as ending
the obligations between it and the Respondents and the Appellant
then acted to so accomplish such an ending.

The Appellant should

not be allowed to now change its position.
POINT III
THE APPELLANT IS ESTOPPED FROM ASSERTING A CLAIM TO ANY PRODUCE WH!Cc
WAS PART OF THE UNIFORM REAL ESTATE CONTRACT.
In Cook v. Cook, et al., 110 U. 406, 174 P. 2d 434 (1946), a
case involving the payment of insurance proceeds, this Court stated:
"To constitute an estoppel there must be conduct
amounting to a misrepresentation or concealment of
material facts; these facts must be known to the party
sought to be estopped and unknown to the party who
claims the benefit of the estoppel and who, relying
upon such conduct, acted upon it to his loss." At P. 2d
436.
[Also see Migliaccio v. Davis, et al., 120 U. 1,
232 P. 2d 195 (1951).]
Applying the law in that case, it is clear that the Trial
Court correctly found estoppel to be applicable.

The Appellant

cannot now assert any claim to beef, lamb, potatoes, honey and wheat
under the Uniform Real Estate Contract after the Termination Agreement has been executed.

!

From the testimony given at the time of

trial, as previously noted, the Appellant represented to the Respondents that all obligations under the Uniform Real Estate Contract had ended.

The Appellant made no mention that the obligation

to supply beef, lamb, potatoes, honey and wheat was not terminated
by the Agreement.

The Appellant concealed from the Respondents that

the obligation to supply beef, lamb, potatoes, honey and wheat
continued after the signing of the Termination Agreement and misrep·
resented to them that not all obligations under the Uniform Real
Estate Contract ended upon execution of that Agreement.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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I

I

The fact that the obligation to supply beef, lamb, potatoes,
honey and wheat might ·possibly continue beyond the Termination Agreement was known by the Appellant alone, and not the Respondents.

The

Respondents believed that all obligations under the Uniform Real
Estate Contract, including the obligation to supply beef, lamb,
potatoes, honey and wheat, terminated upon execution of the Termination Agreement.

Thus, the first two requirements of Cook v. cook,

et al., supra, have been met.
Finally, the Respondents acted to their detriment in relying
upon the Termination Agreement in that upon executing the Termination Agreement the Respondents realized that they would thereafter
be without any means to furnish produce to the Appellants.

But

acting upon the representations made by the Appellant and the beliefs induced by such representations, the Respondents entered into
the Termination Agreement whereby they would lose the land from
which they were to furnish the beef, lamb, potatoes, honey and wheat.
Thus, all the requirements of Cook v. Cook, eL al., supra,
were presented by the evidence and the Trial Court properly held
the Appellant to be estopped from asserting a claim to the produce.
The actions of the Appellant would lead a person to believe
that the obligations between the parties had terminated upon the exectuion of the Termination Agreement.
30

u.

In Corporation Nine v. Taylor,

2d 47, 513 P. 2d 417 (1973), a case involving specific per-

formance of a real estate contract, this Court said:
"The test to be applied is an objective one as to what
a reasonable and prudent person in the circumstances
might conclude
At P. 2d 420.
In view of the actions of the Appellant in this matter, where
the Appellant told the Respondents that their obligations under the
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Uniform Real Estate Contract had encee'
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App•

mention anything about t.he beef, J_amb, potatoes, honey
the time of the execution of the Termination Agreement; and that
the Appellant made no demand upon the Respondents for the beef,
lamb, potatoes, honey and wheat for almost three years; it is clear
that the beliefs and actions of the Respondents were what a

reaso~

able and prudent person in like circumstances might conclude.
It should also be noted that it would be unconscionable to
require the Respondents to furnish the beef, lamb, potatoes, honey
and wheat, or their cash equivalent, to the Appellants.

In~,

et al. v. Spencer, et al., 121 U. 468, 243 P. 2d 446 (1952), a case
involving the cancellation of a contract for the purchase of realty
and return of the down payment, this Court stated:
11
where enforcement of the forfeiture provision
would allow an unconscionable and exorbitant recovery,
bearing no reasonable relationship to the actual damage
suffered, we have uniformly held it to be unenforceable
II
At P. 2d 450.

In the case presently before this Court the Appellant has
suffered no actual damage.

Though Perkins, et al. v. Spencer, et

al., supra, was about a forfeiture provision, the same unconscionable
and exorbitant recovery that was attempted in that case is being
attempted in this case.

This Court should not allow enforcement of

the continuing obligation of the Respondents to supply the Appellant
with beef, lamb, potatoes, honey and wheat, especially since the
Appellant has retaken the farm which was the only means that the
Respondents had for supplying such items to the Appellant.
Though the defense of estoppel was not affirmatively ple~
in the instant action, a motion to amend the pleadings to conform
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to the evidence was made to the Court and granted.

Utah Rules

of Civil Procedure, Rule 15 (b).
Such action by the Court was proper because the evidence of
estoppel was before the Court.
6 U.

2d 226,

Buehner Block Company v. Glezos,

310 P. 2d 517 (1957).

In this case before the Court the same issues of law and
fact would have been presented to the Court whether or not the
court had made a ruling on whether the Appellant was estopped to
assert its claim.
by

The Appellant was not prejudiced in any manner

Respondents' failure to affirmatively plead estoppel.

The iss-

ues of fact and law remained the same whether or not estoppel was
raised in the pleadings by the Respondents.

The Trial Court would

not have heard any new evidence in this matter had estoppel been
affirmatively plead.

The actions of the Trial Court in denying

the claim of the Appellant to any beef, lamb, potatoes, honey and
wheat was proper.
CONCLUSION
The Respondents submit that the District Court was correct
in its finding that the Termination Agreement was ambiguous and
that the same should be construed against its maker, to-wit:

the

Appellant.
The District Court was Further correct in finding that the
Appellants were estopped to now claim the beef, lamb, potatoes,
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honey and wheat from the Respondents and thus the decision of the
District Court should be affirmed and Respondents should be
their costs.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

of

:::::Y,

a·.-arde~

1977.
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N. BEASLEY
Cotro-Manes, Warr, Fankhauser
Attorneys for Respondents
Suite 430 Judge Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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